If we had to rely only on our own observation, experience and memory, we should never get very far in advancing our knowledge; we rely, too, upon the experience of others—parents, teachers, and those who have recorded their experience in books for our benefit. In our early years we adopt without question judgments ready made for us by our elders. The proverbs and proverbial sayings which we have heard quoted and applied so often what are many of them but judgments neatly or arrestingly expressed in picturesque language?
But civilisation and the growth of knowledge are only possible if these popular judgments are continually being tested and confirmed, modified or rejected in the light of experience. If we refused to modify them to suit new conditions or to tally with new evidence, or if we discarded or rejected them out of hand without due reason, we should be equally mistaken. But we are more likely to adhere to them too long after they have outworn their usefulness; students of Economic and Political History know that the theories of Mercantilism, Laissez-faire and Splendid Isolation, took, like Charles II, an unconscionable time in dying. Nowadays, when conditions — political, economic and social, national and international — change so quickly, it is more necessary than ever to take stock of our cherished convictions, and to remember that "a truth remains true as long as it is the best to be had; it becomes false as soon as it can be bettered."
At this point it is convenient to deal with the charge of inconsistency which is frequently brought, quite justifiably, against those who change their opinions, and to attempt to give a satisfactory definition of the term; and I cannot do better than give an abstract of Archbishop Whately's remarks on this topic.
"Strictly speaking," he says, " inconsistency (such at least as a wise and good man is exempt from) is the maintaining at the same time two contradictory propositions; whether expressed in language, or implied in sentiments or conduct. As, e.g., if the same person censures and abhors oppression, yet practises it towards others; or if he prescribes two medicines which neutralise each other's effects, etc.
"But a man is often censured as inconsistent if he changes his plans or his opinions on any point. And certainly if he does this often, and lightly, that is good ground for withholding confidence from him. But it would be more precise to characterise him as fickle and unsteady, than as inconsistent; because this use of the term tends to confound one fault with another; viz., with holding two incompatible opinions at once.
"But, moreover, a man is often charged with inconsistency for approving some parts of a book, system, character, etc., and disapproving others; for being now an advocate for peace, and now, for war; in short, for accommodating his judgment or his conduct to the circumstances before him, as the mariner sets his sails to the wind. In this case there is not even any change of mind implied; yet for this a man is often taxed with inconsistency; though in many instances there would even be an inconsistency in the opposite procedure; e.g., in not shifting the sails when the wind changes.
"In the other case, indeed—when a man does change his mind—he implies some error, either first or last. But some errors every man is liable to, who is not infallible. He therefore who prides himself on his consistency, on the ground of resolving never to change his plans or opinions, does virtually (unless he means to proclaim himself either too dull to detect his mistakes, or too obstinate to own them) lay claim to infallibility. And if at the same time he ridicules (as is often done) the absurdity of a claim to infallibility, he is guilty of a gross inconsistency in the proper and primary sense of the word.
"But it is much easier to boast of consistency than to preserve it. For as, in the dark, adverse troops may take post near each other, without mutual recognition, and consequently without contest, but as soon as daylight comes, the weaker give place to the stronger; so, in a misty and darkened mind, the most incompatible opinions may exist together, without any perception of their discrepancy; till the understanding becomes sufficiently enlightened to enable the man to reject the less reasonable opinions, and retain the opposites.
"It may be added, that it is a very fair ground for disparaging anyone's judgment, if he maintains any doctrine or system, avowedly for the sake of consistency. That must always be a bad reason. If the system, etc., is right, you should pursue it because it is right, and not because you have pursued it hitherto; if it is wrong, your having once committed a fault is a poor reason to give for persisting in it."
On some controversial topics it is impossible in the nature of things for us to depend upon first-hand evidence for new facts. We must depend upon what we read in books or newspapers; we must put ourselves in the hands of the experts. Where the experts disagree, we can examine and weigh their evidence in much the same way as a judge sums up in a court of law. But we must be careful, in estimating the value of the evidence, to remember that
As regards (2) and (3), often the most efficient and successful worker in a limited sphere in any business, industry or profession, is the very last person to speak with authority on the business as a whole. Again, a successful business man, merely because he is a successful business man, is not thereby qualified to express authoritative views on wider questions of economics, much less politics.
No Government could fail to benefit from the inclusion among its members of men who have made their mark in business or commerce. Men with practical experience are needed to help in solving pressing economic problems; and some Government departments, such as the Post Office, are best run on business lines and with the aid of the latest business methods. Successful business men are likely to prove enterprising administrators; they have had experience in checking waste and extravagance, in managing their subordinates adroitly, and generally in running their departments with the maximum of efficiency and the minimum of friction. Such qualities are valuable enough, but they are not all that are required in a statesman. Success in the limited sphere of industry or commerce, or in the still more restricted sphere of a single business, no matter how wide its ramifications, may handicap rather than assist a man in managing the affairs of his country. In fact, his previous experience may effectually prevent his taking a wide view, embracing his countrymen's interests as a whole. A man of culture and wide sympathies, with an alert and vigorous mind, with no first-hand experience of an office or a factory, will often be more capable of conceiving broad policies, coordinating diverse or reconciling clashing interests, than one who has spent a lifetime immersed in the details of business management.
Civil servants, policemen and schoolmasters have on more than one occasion protested against the practice of filling some of the more responsible posts in government departments, the police force and the teaching profession with recruits from outside their regular ranks. One can readily understand and even sympathise with the disappointment of those whose hopes of promotion have thus been dashed; but each case has to be judged on its merits, and no one could seriously contend that success in a subordinate position is the sole or even a sure criterion of fitness for the position of a principal.
Transfer Of Ability
The problem of the transference of training in education raises similar questions. For many years Latin was regarded as an essential subject in the grammar school curriculum mainly in the belief that it was a valuable mental gymnastic, inculcating habits of accurate and exact thought and expression that were transferred inevitably to other subjects and reacted favourably on all forms of mental activity. This belief has lately been shown to be largely a myth. (Compare Chapter Seven,p.'44.)
There is a tendency, too, to allow scientists to tell us what we ought to think about subjects in which they have no special competence, and as for the popular newspapers and magazines, they try to persuade us that any person 'in the news' has opinions worth our consideration on almost any question outside his legitimate province. We might be inclined to listen to Miss X., the champion lawn-tennis player, on the subject of the backhand stroke at that game, but not to give equal weight to her ideas, say, on the rearing of children; or to Sir X.Y.Z., the record-breaking motorist, on internal-combustion engines, but not on International Co-operation.
The power of the Press to influence our judgments in its presentation of facts about current affairs is so important as to deserve fuller treatment in a separate chapter. It is sufficient here to point out the folly and danger of swallowing indiscriminately whatever we see in print, whether in books or newspapers. It is impossible in the limited compass of this book to deal adequately with the canons of historical evidence, i.e., to examine the methods by which historians estimate the value and importance of documentary evidence in arriving at the truth. But it might be profitable here to give examples how mistakes can be made. A writer recently wrote an article on the Russian Revolution. He had consulted two authorities which had adopted different chronological systems—one the Western, the other the Russian Calendar. The result is that many events in his narrative are described twice and as having happened at different times. Again, an American writer failed to distinguish between two great English thinkers, J. S. and J. B. S. Haldane, father and son. He was at great pains to try to reconcile apparent inconsistencies in the views of a single, composite Haldane!
I have already pointed out how mistakes may arise from faulty or fictitious quotations. As we have seen from the example quoted above, not only can "the devil cite Scripture to his purpose," but he can also invent it when it suits him!
A warning, too, is necessary against accepting generalisations, however neatly or attractively put, as substitutes for facts. In our judgments on history, for example, we should beware of contenting ourselves with dismissing Richard III as "a bad king," or Cromwell as "a tyrant," or Gladstone as "a humbug," and of assuming that such question-begging verdicts are efficient substitutes for facts or arguments. Many of the historical text-books used in schools, which are necessarily highly condensed and simplified to suit the youthful understanding, are full of such generalisations; and when they are imperfectly understood or only half digested by the immature intelligence, the net result is the kind of history presented to us so brilliantly by the authors of 1066 and All That
Again, beware of accepting at their face value statements beginning "Everybody says . . .." or "Everyone knows . . ." These statements may be commonly made, or may be the expressions of common opinion, but they are not necessarily true or common sense. Similarly, because you see a statement repeated a number of times, do not assume that it must be true; and because a statement or opinion has remained unquestioned or unchallenged for some time, do not assume that it has acquired some magic potency that makes it unquestionable and beyond challenge.
Many errors in all departments of knowledge tend to become perpetuated by being repeated slavishly or uncritically by successive writers. A statement of opinion by one writer may be re-stated as a fact by another, who may in turn be quoted as an authority by yet another; and this process may continue indefinitely, unless it occurs to someone to question the facts on which the original writer based his opinion or to challenge the interpretation he placed upon those facts. Imagine the confusion that might arise in the future if the mistakes referred to in a previous paragraph were repeated by successive writers over a number of years!
Dr R. H. Whitehouse, the author of recent standard works on Zoology, lately showed me a diagram, incorrect in a very important particular, which had been drawn some sixty years ago and had been copied or reprinted many times since in different text-books without any attempt at correction.
A natural aversion to thinking, and the temptation to take the line of least resistance, makes people prone to accept without question the opinions and judgments made for them by the leaders and headlines of the popular Press, the slogans of advertisers, and the catch-phrases of politicians. The prominence given to them makes it difficult to avoid them. Not only are we so naturally susceptible to the influence of constant iteration that we tend to imbibe them unconsciously, but also it needs constant effort to resist the methods of modern publicity. The merchants of that article know our weakness and trade upon it.